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So What If I'm
Gonna Hurt Myself:
The ADA's Direct
Threat Defense
by Tory L. Lucas

Introduction

A

high beam walking ironworker atop a skyscraper develops a severe case of vertigo. A power saw operator
develops narcolepsy. Must the employers of these individuals allow them to continue working regardless of the risk
they pose to their own safety? The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) clearly provides a defense to discrimination
against an individual with a disability when the individual poses
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace. What if the employee poses a direct threat to his own
health or safety, but does not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace?

Tory L. Lucas received his B.A.,
magna cum laude, from CulverStockton College and J.D., summa
cum laude, from Creighton
University; LL.M. (thesis pending),
University of Missouri- Kansas
City). Tony is a law clerk for The
Honorable William Jay Riley of
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. Before
joining Judge Riley's staff, Tory
was the Arthur Mag Fellow in Law
at the University of MissouriKansas City School of Law, served
as a judge advocate in the United
States Air Force, and was a litigation associate in private practice in
Sioux City, Iowa.

Since the ADA became law more than a decade ago, many attorneys have assumed the direct threat defense allowed employers
to discriminate against an individual with a disability if the individual posed a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace. While acknowledging it has no
textual support in the ADA, an author of a disability law textbook made the following statement: “It is clear that . . . the ADA
[does not] require employment of individuals when such action
would result in a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace.”1
Even though the ADA does not specifically include a threat-toself defense, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) expanded the direct threat defense to include direct
threats to one’s own health or safety. Some federal courts
deferred to the EEOC’s expansion of the direct threat defense.
However, some courts refused to defer, holding that an individual with a disability cannot be denied a job just because the individual poses a direct threat to his own health or safety.
Because the appellate courts were split, the United States
Supreme Court decided the issue last summer, holding the
EEOC’s expanded direct threat regulation was permissible.2
Until then, courts, attorneys, employers and employees were left
floundering on whether the direct threat defense included direct
threats to one’s own health and safety. This article will describe
the ADA’s direct threat defense and how the EEOC expanded it,
discuss how lower federal courts analyzed the direct threat
defense, examine the Supreme Court’s direct threat decision, and
briefly analyze the contours of the direct threat defense.


7

The Nebraska Lawyer September 2003

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974054

The Statutory and Regulatory
Direct Threat Defense
The ADA’s Direct Threat Defense
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the individual’s disability.3 A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual
with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.”4 The ADA authorizes discrimination against individuals with disabilities in certain circumstances: “It
may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this Act that an alleged
application of qualification standards,
tests, or selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a
job or benefit to an individual with a
disability has been shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot
be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”5 In addition to that general
defense, the ADA specifically provides
for a defense to employment discrimination based on qualification standards:
“The term ‘qualification standards’ may
include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace.”6 Clearly, this provision
sets forth the direct threat defense. The
ADA defines “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”7
A simple reading of the ADA’s plain language reveals nothing in the direct threat
defense authorizes an employer to discriminate against an individual with a
disability when that individual poses a
direct threat to his own health or safety. It
only specifically allows for such a
defense when the individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace. The
ADA’s plain language does not end the
inquiry, however, as the ADA specifically
authorized the EEOC to issue and
enforce regulations implementing the
ADA.8 The EEOC has complied with this
Congressional charge.

The EEOC’s Direct Threat Defense
Under express Congressional authority,
the EEOC has interpreted the ADA in an
exhaustive set of regulations.9 The EEOC
has specifically interpreted the direct
threat defense and expanded it under its
regulations. While the ADA seems to
limit the direct threat defense to the
health or safety of others in the workplace, the EEOC’s regulations extend the
defense to include those circumstances
where an individual with a disability
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of himself or others in the workplace.
The EEOC follows the ADA’s general
defense to discrimination charges whenever qualification standards have “been
shown to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation.”10 However, when it
comes to the direct threat defense, the
EEOC charts a different course: “The term
‘qualification standard’ may include a
requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the
workplace.”11 As can readily be seen, the
EEOC extends the direct threat defense to
include direct threats to the individual’s
own health or safety in addition to others
in the workplace. Finally, the EEOC
defines direct threat as “a significant risk
of substantial harm to the health or
safety of the individual or others that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.”12 The EEOC
requires that any direct threat determination “be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to
safely perform the essential functions of
the job” and “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the
most current medical knowledge and/or on
the best available objective evidence.”13
Before the Supreme Court decided the
issue, some courts followed the EEOC
regulations, allowing employers to discriminate against individuals with disabilities who posed a direct threat to their
own health or safety, regardless of the
threat posed to other individuals in the
workplace. Other courts struck down the
EEOC’s expansion of the direct threat
defense because it contradicted the ADA’s
plain language and legislative history.

Lower Courts Tackle Direct
Threat Defense
Courts Defer to EEOC’s Direct
Threat Defense
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
cavalierly addressed the direct threat
defense seven years ago without analysis.
In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,14
an employer fired an employee because
of his epilepsy. The employee stipulated
that, had he continued working, he would
have had seizures on the job. His
assigned jobs included sitting on a platform above fast-moving rollers, sitting
underneath a conveyor belt, and working
next to exposed machinery with temperatures of 350 degrees. The court recognized each of the employee’s “assigned
tasks presented grave risks to an employee with a seizure disorder.”15 After his
employer fired him for posing a direct
threat to his own safety, the employee
sued under the ADA. The employer
asserted the direct threat defense and
the district court granted summary judgment in the employer’s favor. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed after stating
an “employer may fire a disabled
employee if the disability renders the
employee a ‘direct threat’ to his own
health or safety.”16 In doing so, the court
simply cited both the ADA’s and EEOC’s
direct threat provisions.17 The court did
not discuss the disparity between the
ADA’s plain language and the EEOC’s
addition of the threat-to-self defense. Two
years later, the Eleventh Circuit, in
LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc.,18
again suggested the direct threat defense
applies to threats to one’s own health or
safety. In Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal
Co.,19 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
without analysis, stated that, “[u]nder
the ADA it is a defense to a charge of
discrimination if an employee poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of
himself or others.” As seen below, courts
unwilling to yield to the EEOC had conducted the only reasoned analysis of the
direct threat defense.

Ninth Circuit Rejects EEOC’s
Direct Threat Defense
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took
direct aim at the EEOC’s expansion of
Continued on page 10
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the direct threat defense. As you will see
in Section IV below, the Supreme Court
then took direct aim at the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion. In Echazabal v. Chevron USA,
Inc., the court asked “whether the ‘direct
threat’ defense available to employers
under the [ADA] applies to employees, or
prospective employees, who pose a direct
threat to their own health or safety, but
not to the health or safety of other persons in the workplace.”20 Noting this was
a question of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit, the court observed the
issue had received little treatment in
other circuits, and, in the circuits that
had addressed the issue, none provided
useful analysis. Therefore, the court
began an exhaustive analysis of the
threat-to-self defense.
Quoting the ADA, the court aptly concluded “the language of the direct threat
defense plainly does not include threats
to the disabled individual himself.”21
Based on the ADA’s plain language, the
court stated it could have held, without
further analysis, that the ADA does not
allow an employer to use the direct
threat defense when the employee poses
a threat to his own health or safety.
Notwithstanding, the court analyzed the
ADA’s legislative history.
Noting “direct threat” is used hundreds of
times in the ADA’s legislative history, the
court observed that nowhere is the direct
threat defense accompanied by a reference to a threat to the employee himself.22 The court showed that nearly every
time direct threat is even mentioned it is
joined by a reference to a threat to other
individuals.23 The ADA’s co-sponsor,
Senator Edward Kennedy, pronounced
“[i]t is important, however, that the ADA
specifically refers to the health and safety
threat to others. Under the ADA, employers may not deny a person an employment opportunity based on paternalistic
concerns regarding the person’s health.”24
The court also showed Congress believed
“overprotective rules and policies” are
forms of discrimination confronting individuals with disabilities,25 and recognized
that the Supreme Court has generally
“interpreted federal employment discrimination statutes to prohibit paternalistic
employment policies.”26
After concluding the ADA’s plain language and legislative history rejected the
EEOC’s expansion of the direct threat
10

The direct threat
defense is a
complex and
difficult issue
in theory
and practice.
defense, the court squarely addressed the
employer’s arguments. First, the employer argued the court should defer to the
EEOC’s contrary interpretation of the
ADA. Dismissing this argument, the
court rejected the EEOC’s interpretation
because it plainly contradicts Congress’
clear intent: “the language of the direct
threat defense plainly expresses
Congress’s intent to include within the
scope of § 12113 defense only threats to
other individuals in the workplace.”27
The employer’s second argument was
Congress’ clear intent should be ignored
“because forcing employers to hire
individuals who pose a risk to their
own health or safety would expose
employers to tort liability.”28 Referring
to dictum from the Supreme Court in
UAW v. Johnson Controls,29 the court
rejected this argument because “the
Supreme Court strongly suggested that
state tort law would be preempted to the
extent that it interfered with federal
antidiscrimination law.”30
The court then discussed the employer’s
claim that the individual with a disability
who poses a direct threat to his own
safety is not a qualified individual with a
disability because he is not otherwise
qualified to perform the essential job
functions. The court summarily rejected
this contention because the employer’s
“reading of ‘essential functions’ would,
by definitional slight-of-hand, circumvent
Congress’s decision to exclude a paternalistic risk-to-self defense in circumstances
in which an employee’s disability does
not prevent him from performing the
requisite work.”31 Although the court

stated it would, in most circumstances,
defer to an employer’s decision as to
what constitutes an essential job function,
it nevertheless rejected the employer’s
interpretation in the instant case of what
may constitute an essential job function
and held “the risk that [the employee]’s
employment might pose to his own
health does not affect the question
whether he is a ‘qualified individual with
a disability.’”32 The court then summed
up its analysis and holding:
[W]e conclude that the ADA’s direct
threat defense means what it says: it
permits employers to impose a
requirement that their employees not
pose a significant risk to the health
or safety of other individuals in the
workplace. It does not permit
employers to shut disabled individuals out of jobs on the ground that, by
working in the jobs at issue, they
may put their own health or safety at
risk. Conscious of the history of
paternalistic rules that have often
excluded disabled individuals from
the workplace, Congress concluded
that disabled persons should be
afforded the opportunity to decide for
themselves what risks to undertake.33
The three-judge panel was not unanimous, however, as Judge Stephen S. Trott
wrote a scathing dissent.34 The dissent
contended that an employee who poses a
direct threat to his own safety is not otherwise qualified under the ADA: “I do
not understand how we can claim he can
perform the essential functions of the
position he seeks when precisely because
of his disability, those functions may kill
him. To ignore this reality is bizarre.”35
The dissent then noted both state and federal statutes overflow with laws designed
to protect workers from harm. Judge Trott
recognized that America has readily
“rejected the idea that workers toil at
their own peril in the workplace.”36
Citing California and Arizona laws
where “it is a crime knowingly to
subject workers to life-endangering
conditions,” the dissent maintained that
the court, in effect, repealed these laws
with its ruling.37
The dissent also made the following
observation about workplace safety: “So
much for OSHA [i.e., the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970]. Now, our
laws give less protection to workers
The Nebraska Lawyer September 2003

known to be in danger than they afford to
those who are not. That seems upside
down and backwards. Precisely the workers who need protection can sue because
they receive what they need.”38 In addition to concluding that the employee was
not otherwise qualified, the dissent stated
“the EEOC has rationally and humanely
spoken” on the direct threat defense and
the court should have deferred to the
EEOC’s interpretation.39 Therefore, the
dissent would have blessed the EEOC’s
direct threat defense.
The dissent decried “that the majority’s
holding leads to absurd results: a steelworker who develops vertigo can keep
his job constructing high rise buildings; a
power saw operator with narcolepsy or
epilepsy must be allowed to operate his
saw; and a person allergic to bees is
entitled to be hired as a beekeeper. The
possible examples of this Pickwickian
ruling are endless. I doubt that Congress
intended such a result when it enacted
laws to protect persons with disabilities.”40 In a similar vein, a legal commentator criticized the majority for its failure
to understand the gravity of the safety
issues involved:
In its attempt to rid the workplace of
paternalism, the court turned its back
on the state and federal safety laws
that forbid employers from knowingly subjecting workers to life-endangering conditions. As a result,
employers now have an ugly choice
to make: risk an employee’s life or
risk a discrimination suit under
the ADA.41
Finally, the dissent in Echazabal would
have allowed the employer to claim
undue hardship: “I believe it would be an
undue hardship to require an employer to
place an employee in a life-threatening
situation. Such a rule would require
employers knowingly to endanger workers. The legal peril involved is obvious,
and a simple human to human matter,
such a moral burden is unconscionable.”42 In its final analysis, the
dissent gleefully acknowledged a conflict
among the circuits: “Finally, and fortunately, we have created a conflict with the
Eleventh Circuit. . . . I say ‘fortunately’
because this conflict will compel the
Supreme Court — or Congress — to
resolve this dispute — unless we do so
ourselves by way of en banc review.”43
The Nebraska Lawyer September 2003

safety in another context. Specifically, the
court asserted an employer may be able
to use the defense that a qualification
standard excluding an employee with a
disability who poses a direct threat to his
own safety if the standard is job related
and consistent with business necessity.46
The court also suggested an employee
still must prove he is a qualified individual with a disability, which he may not be
able to do if he poses a direct threat to his
own safety.47

Judge Trott’s prophesy was realized when
the Supreme Court resolved the dispute
by authorizing the EEOC’s expansion of
the direct threat defense. An examination
of the Supreme Court’s decision is contained in section IV below.

Courts Adopt Hybrid Analysis
Analyzing the direct threat defense as the
Ninth Circuit did in Echazabal, some
courts agreed the defense does not apply
to threats to one’s own health or safety.
These courts nevertheless allowed
employers to claim an individual is not a
qualified individual with a disability
when he poses a direct threat to his own
health or safety.
In one of the first cases to address the
direct threat issue, a federal trial court in
Illinois concluded, in Kohnke v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., “that any ‘direct threat’
jury instruction must refer to a direct
threat to others, not a direct threat to
[the disabled employee] himself.”44
With precision analysis, the court
quickly dismissed the EEOC’s expansion
of the direct threat defense to include
threats to self as untenable. Reviewing
the ADA’s plain meaning, legislative history and caselaw (which was nonexistent
at the time), the court determined the
direct threat defense only applies to
threats to others in the workplace.45
Notwithstanding, the court still allowed
the employer to raise the employee’s

A federal district court in Iowa also provided a compelling discussion of the
direct threat defense and aligned itself
with Kohnke. In Kalskett v. Larson
Manufacturing Co.,48 the court rejected
any argument an employer can use the
direct threat defense against an individual
with a disability when the individual
poses a direct threat to the individual’s
own health or safety. Specifically, the
court concluded “the defense of direct
threat to oneself is not a defense authorized by the plain language of the statute
authorizing the defense of direct threat to
others.”49 Instead of analyzing the case
under the direct threat defense, the court
analyzed the threat to the individual’s
own health and safety under the qualification element of the individual’s prima
facie ADA claim.50 Thus, the court held
that an individual with a disability “has
the burden to demonstrate whether she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job without risk of injury to
herself. In other words, if [the individual]
cannot perform the essential functions of
a job without risk of injury to herself,
and that risk of injury cannot be prevented by a reasonable accommodation, [the
individual] cannot perform the essential
functions of the job as required by the
qualification element.”51
With some courts accepting the EEOC’s
direct threat defense, the Ninth Circuit
rejecting it, and other courts transporting
the direct threat defense to the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, employers and employees were subject to different standards.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court ended the
confusion last year.

Supreme Court Authorizes EEOC’s
Direct Threat Defense
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s ruling striking down the EEOC’s direct threat
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defense, the United States Supreme Court
held the ADA permits the EEOC’s regulation.52 The Court scrupulously explained
its reasoning for deferring to the EEOC’s
interpretation of the direct threat defense.
The Court first recognized the ADA “creates an affirmative defense for action
under a qualification standard ‘shown to
be job-related [and] . . . consistent with
business necessity.’”53 Citing the ADA’s
direct threat defense as “[s]uch a standard,” the Court immediately admitted
the EEOC’s direct threat regulation “carries the defense one step further.”54
Echazabal contended the ADA’s direct
threat defense constitutes a textual bar to
the EEOC’s expansive regulation, leaving
no gaps for the EEOC to fill.55 Echazabal
recognized the “job-related” and “business necessity” defense would have
authorized a threat-to-self defense, but
argued the addition of the specific threatto-others defense eliminated the possibility of a threat-to-self defense.56 To bolster
this argument, Echazabal showed how the
EEOC had recognized a threat-to-self
defense under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 before the ADA was enacted, arguing the limited ADA direct threat defense
precludes a regulatory expansion.57 The
Court recognized the Ninth Circuit relied
on this argument in applying the interpretive canon, expressio unius exclusio
alterius, which means “expressing one
item of an associated group or series
excludes another left unmentioned.”58
However, the Court rejected the expression-exclusion rule for three reasons.
First, the Court concluded, based on the
ADA’s text, Congress included the harmto-others provision as simply an example
of a legitimate qualification standard that
is job-related and consistent with business
necessity.59 The Court showed how
Congress wrote that qualification standards captured by the “job related” and
“business necessity” defense “may
include” a direct threat to others.60
Classifying the defenses contained in sections 12113(a) and (b) as “spacious
defensive categories,” the Court decided
they gave the EEOC “a good deal of discretion in setting the limits of permissible
qualification standards.”61
Second, the Court recognized the ADA
does not contain an established series of
terms, including threats to others and self,
12

from which an omission of one establishes a negative implication of the other.62
Echazabal claimed history shows
Congress deliberately omitted the threatto-self defense. Specifically, Echazabal
shows how the Rehabilitation Act, like
the ADA, contained only a threat-to-others defense, but the EEOC expanded it to
include threat-to-self as well. As
Congress passed the ADA without a
threat-to-self defense, after the EEOC had
expanded the Rehabilitation Act’s threatto-others defense, Echazabal argued this
proves Congress deliberately rejected the
threat-to-self defense.63 The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First,
although the EEOC amplified the
Rehabilitation Act’s text by including a
threat-to-self defense, three other interpreting agencies did not.64 Given no standard usage by agencies, the Court refused
to connect threat-to-self with threat-toothers such that the expression-exclusion
rule would apply to Congress’s action.65
The Court then recognized Congress
passed the ADA’s threat-to-others defense
by using the same language it had used in
the Rehabilitation Act, “knowing full well
what the EEOC had made of that language.”66 Thus, Congress’s use of identical language could either mean it rejected
the EEOC’s addition of the threat-to-self
defense or assumed the EEOC had the
authority to expand the defense again
under the ADA as it had done under the
Rehabilitation Act.67 “Omitting the
EEOC’s reference to self-harm while
using the very language that the EEOC
had read as consistent with recognizing
self-harm is equivocal at best. No negative inference is possible.”69
Finally, the Court briefly engaged in
slippery slope reasoning as further
justification for rejecting the expressionexclusion rule. Recognizing Congress
chose to specify only threats to others in
the workplace, strict application of the
expression-exclusion rule would disallow
a defense when an employee poses a
threat to others outside the workplace as
well: “If Typhoid Mary had come under
the ADA, would a meat packer have been
defenseless if Mary had sued after being
turned away?”69
Concluding Congress’s inclusion of the
threat-to-others defense did not exclude
the threat-to-self defense, the Court then
analyzed whether Chevron deference
should attach to the EEOC’s direct threat

defense.70 In deferring to the EEOC’s
expansion of the direct threat defense, the
Court focused on the interaction between
the ADA and OSHA. Specifically, an
employer’s decision to hire an individual
with a disability who poses a direct threat
to his own safety “would put Congress’s
policy in the ADA, a disabled individual’s right to operate on equal terms
within the workplace, at loggerheads
with the competing policy of OSHA, to
ensure the safety of ‘each’ and ‘every’
worker.”71 Thus, the EEOC made a proper substantive choice between two competing objectives.72
The Court then rejected the argument that
the EEOC’s direct threat defense allows
the type of paternalism the ADA tried to
outlaw.73 The Court decided the EEOC
reasonably interpreted the ADA to strike
at “untested and pretextual stereotypes,”
but refused to force employers to ignore
“specific and documented risks to the
employee himself, even if the employee
would take his chances for the sake of
getting a job.”74 In addition, the regulation’s particularized inquiry requirement
disallows an employer from claiming it
excluded an individual with a disability
for the individual’s own good when the
employee really does not pose a direct
threat to his own safety.75
Finally, the Court rejected the argument
that the ADA’s direct threat defense had
been rendered mere surplusage.76 Just
because the threat-to-self defense could
reasonably fall within the general jobrelated and business necessity defense
did not make Congress’s direct threat
defense useless.77 For instance, specifically including the defense avoided
future litigation or rulemaking fights
over the issue.78 Furthermore, the
Court noted “[a] provision can be useful
even without congressional attention
being indispensable.”79

Brief Analysis of Direct Threat Defense
Given the Supreme Court’s validation of
the EEOC’s direct threat defense, it is
imperative for attorneys to understand
when and how the defense applies.
Briefly, I will discuss the scope of the
defense and the Supreme Court’s narrow
interpretation of it. The focus of this section is to implore attorneys to understand
Continued on page 14
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that the direct threat defense should be
sparingly utilized.
The direct threat defense is a complex
and difficult issue in theory and practice.
Individuals with disabilities have been
stereotyped for centuries
and fear is a huge discriminator. The direct
threat defense, as applied
to an individual who
poses a threat to his own
safety, could be sporadically and illogically
applied to individuals
with disabilities based on
stereotypes and fear.
Clearly the ADA
attempted to shoot down a paternalistic
employer’s ability to discriminate against
individuals with disabilities based on
unsubstantiated stereotypes and fears.
Americans clearly have an interest in
assuring individuals with disabilities have
the right to make their own employment
decisions rather than paternalistic
employers. For the most part, the ADA
supports such a view. However, in the
limited circumstances in which the direct
threat defense may apply, the employee’s
safety outweighs the employee’s right to
work. Because the direct threat defense
only applies in limited circumstances,
attorneys must be extremely critical
when analyzing an employer’s attempted
use of the defense. Although it may
appear at first blush that an individual
with a disability could easily be negated
a job opportunity based on the likelihood
he would pose a direct threat to his
own health or safety, I do not believe
that is the case. If properly applied, the
narrowly-interpreted direct threat
defense will exclude individuals with
disabilities in rare circumstances for three
main reasons.

event or the danger posed by performing
non-essential functions. Instead, the threat
must be based on the current state of the
disability and the existing threat it poses
to the individual’s safety while performing the job’s essential functions. In addi-

on a reasonable medical judgment,
the use of the direct threat defense should
be diminished.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has revealed
that the use of the direct threat defense is
not readily attainable. In
Bragdon v. Abbott,87 a
dentist’s examination of
an HIV-infected patient
discovered a cavity. The
dentist informed the
patient that he did not fill
cavities of HIV-infected
patients at his office, but
offered to fill the cavity
at a local hospital, with
the patient absorbing the
additional cost of using the hospital’s
facilities. The patient sued the dentist
under the ADA’s prohibition of disability
discrimination in places of public accommodation,88 and the dentist asserted a
direct threat defense. The district court
granted summary judgment to the patient,
holding the dentist presented no genuine
issue of material fact that the patient
posed a direct threat to others.89 On
appeal, the Supreme Court recognized
that Title III of the ADA, like Title I dealing with employment, contains an exclusion where the “individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.”90
As the Supreme Court further recognized,
Title III’s direct threat provision parallels
Title I’s employment provision, so the
Court’s analysis applies with equal force
to employment cases applying the direct
threat defense.

Because the direct threat defense
only applies in limited circumstances,
attorneys must be extremely critical
when analyzing an employer’s
attempted use of the defense.

First, decisions based on unsubstantiated
fears and stereotypes will not carry the
day.80 In order to show an individual cannot perform his job safely without posing
a significant risk of substantial harm to
his own health or safety, an employer
must rely on more than mere stereotypes
or simple speculation. As the EEOC has
propounded, the direct threat determination can only be made after an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job.”81 Therefore, the
threat cannot be based on some future
14

tion, the direct threat assessment must
“be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”82 Assumptions
and best guesses will not suffice. When
deciding whether the direct threat defense
applies, an employer should consider the
following factors: “(1) The duration of
the risk; (2) The nature and severity of
the potential harm; (3) The likelihood
that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential
harm.”83 A proper consideration of
these factors, along with the appropriate
individualized assessment based on “the
most current medical knowledge and/or
on the best available objective evidence,”
will not allow the direct threat defense to
be abused.
Second, the direct threat standard does
not allow an employer to exclude an
individual with a disability when that
individual’s disability might pose a direct
threat to his own health or safety. Instead,
the employee must pose a significant risk
to his health or safety.84 The Supreme
Court has recognized that, “[b]ecause
few, if any, activities in life are risk free,
[the ADA does] not ask whether a risk
exists, but whether it is significant.”85
Furthermore, the standard does not
simply require a significant risk of any
harm to the employee’s health or safety.
Instead, the EEOC requires a significant
risk of substantial harm to meet this standard.86 Therefore, a high probability must
exist that the individual is indeed a danger to himself and that the resulting
injury would be substantial. When this
heightened standard is combined with the
required individualized assessment based

In determining whether the direct threat
defense applied, the Supreme Court had
to decide whether the patient posed “a
significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary
aids or services.”91 The Court stressed
that “[t]he existence, or nonexistence, of
a significant risk must be determined
from the standpoint of the person who
refuses the treatment or accommodation,
and the risk assessment must based on
medical or other objective evidence.”92 It
is important to note the Court refused to
defer to the dentist’s judgment of the
potential risk: “As a health care professional, [the dentist] had the duty to assess
the risk of infection based on the objective, scientific information available to
him and others in his profession. His
The Nebraska Lawyer September 2003

belief that a significant risk existed, even
if maintained in good faith, would not
relieve him from liability . . . [because he]
receives no special deference simply
because he is a health care professional.”93 The dentist was unable to show
objective, medical evidence that treating
the patient in the hospital was safer than
treating her in his well-equipped office.94
The dentist then argued “that the use of
high-speed drills and surface cooling
with water created a risk of airborne HIV
transmission.”95 The Court rejected
this assertion because it was based on
inconclusive studies. The dentist also
asserted that the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) “had identified seven
dental workers with possible occupational
transmission of HIV.”96 The Court also
rejected this evidence because, although
the “dental workers were exposed to
HIV in the course of their employment,”
the “CDC could not determine whether
HIV infection had resulted from this
exposure . . . because [the workers] did
not present themselves for HIV testing at
an appropriate time after this occupational
exposure.”97 Regardless, this evidence,
“[s]tanding alone, [would not likely] meet
the objective, scientific basis for finding a
significant risk to the [dentist].”98
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At its core, Bragdon announced the direct
threat defense’s medical judgment or
objective evidence standards cannot be
based on good faith beliefs, inconclusive
studies, or potential threats. The threat
must be current and objectively verifiable. Clearly, Bragdon is a high hurdle
for those wishing to assert the direct
threat defense against an individual with
a disability who seeks to work.
Finally, even if an employer has diligently conducted the individualized assessment based on objective medical evidence that would satisfy Bragdon’s high
standard and concluded the employee
poses an immediate direct threat to his
own health or safety, the direct threat
defense is still not authorized. Even if an
individual’s disability poses a direct
threat to his health or safety, the ADA
requires an employer to make a reasonable accommodation (that would not pose
an undue hardship on the employer) so an
individual with a disability can perform a
position’s essential functions. In the
informal, interactive process, the employer and employee should strive to accommodate the individual’s disability to eliminate the threat to the employee’s health
or safety.99 When engaging in the interactive process, the employer and employee should seek to “identify the precise

limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations
that could overcome those limitations.”100
The ADA and EEOC regulations do not
provide an exhaustive list of the types of
reasonable accommodations available.
Indeed, reasonable accommodations are
only limited by the imagination and creativity of those seeking an appropriate
accommodation. At a minimum, the
EEOC regulations state that reasonable
accommodations may include “[m]aking
existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; [j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position;
acquisition or modifications of equipment
or devices; appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training
materials, or policies; the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters; and other
similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.”101 With some work on
both sides, the use of the direct threat
defense should be rendered moot whenever an appropriate accommodation can
be discovered.
The interactive process might discover
reasonable accommodations that would
thwart the absurd results hypothesized by
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Judge Trott’s dissent in Echazabal.
Clearly an ironworker walking the high
beams cannot be placed at risk of falling
because of a severe case of vertigo.
However, a reasonable accommodation
might be the use of a harness or reassignment to a job that is fully enclosed.
Surely a honey producer would not be
required to force a beekeeper who is
deathly allergic to bees to freely roam
amongst the bees. A reasonable accommodation could be the provision of shots
or protective gear. Finally, a power saw
operator with narcolepsy should not just
operate the saw as though no risk of
injury exists. A reasonable accommodation might include a unique shut off or
protective guards. In Moses, the court
held the employee posed a direct threat to
his own health or safety. Therefore, the
employer could fire him. You will recall
the employee had epilepsy and stipulated
that he would have had seizures on the
job if he continued to work. His essential
job functions included working above
fast-moving rollers, underneath a conveyor belt, and next to hot machines. Was no
reasonable accommodation available to
ensure the employee’s safety? Once the
direct threat defense was held to apply, I
believe the focus should have switched to
the reasonable accommodation element.
Focusing on this element would have
appropriately protected the worker’s and
employer’s rights. The bottom line is that,
once it has been properly shown an individual with a disability poses a direct
threat to his own health or safety, the
employer and employee still must seek a
reasonable accommodation to eliminate
the threat. This interactive process, combined with the tough standards discussed
above, should limit the use of the direct
threat defense.

myths, speculation or unfocused paternalism. Requiring employers to conduct an
individualized assessment based on the
most current medical knowledge or best
available objective evidence to determine
whether an individual poses a significant
risk of substantial harm to himself will
not allow stereotypes, fear and unreasonable inferences to run amok. By buttressing this heightened standard with the
required interactive process to find reasonable accommodations, the direct threat
defense should be used only as a last
resort. With these standards in mind,
attorneys should be well-equipped to analyze the difficult question of whether an
individual poses a direct threat to his own
health or safety. TNL

Endnotes available upon request. Contact Kathryn
Bellman, kbellman@nebar.com or Pamela Moore,
pmoore@nebar.com at the NSBA office, (402) 4757091 or (800) 927-0117. Endnotes can also be
obtained online at www.nebar.com, at “The
Nebraska Lawyer” button.

Conclusion
Determining whether the ADA’s direct
threat defense applied to threats to oneself had posed a vexing question to
courts, employers and employees until
the Supreme Court unanimously
announced that the EEOC properly
expanded the direct threat defense to
include threats to self. Applying the direct
threat defense to threats to self will
ensure individuals with disabilities will
not endanger themselves, while the strict
application of the defense will ensure
individuals with disabilities are not discriminated against based on stereotypes,
16
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